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ABSTRACT:  In the early 1950s the American physicist David Bohm (1917-1992) 
lived through a critical moment, when he produced a new interpretation for quantum 
mechanics and had to flee from the United States as McCarthyisms victim. At that time he 
faced vicissitudes related to the Cold War and his move from Princeton to São Paulo. This 
article focuses on the reception among physicists of his papers on the causal interpretation, 
which were poorly received at the time. I describe his Brazilian exile and analyze the 
culture of physics surrounding the foundations of quantum mechanics. This article takes 
into account the strength of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics among 
physicists, the way in which issues concerning the foundations of quantum mechanics were 
present in the training of physicists, the low status of these issues on research agendas, and 
the kind of results Bohm and collaborators were able to achieve. It also compares the 
reception of Bohms ideas with that of Hugh Everetts interpretation. This article argues 
that the obstacles growing from the cultural context of physics at that time had a more 
significant influence in the reception of Bohm’s ideas than did the vicissitudes related to 
the McCarthyist climate. 
 
WHEN DAVID BOHM and Richard Feynman concluded their physics 
dissertations, during the first half of the 1940s, they were among the most promising 
students of their generation in American physics. After the war, however, their fates were 
very different. Feynman reached the zenith of his scientific career in the United States. In 
1951, Bohm was forced to leave the United States forever. Before that, he got a position in 
Princeton, carried out his research on plasma theory, and published a praised graduate 
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textbook entitled Quantum Theory. At that moment, his life suffered two important 
changes. He became a victim of McCarthy’s anticommunist hysteria and changed his 
research focus to a heterodox subject of physics, developing a causal interpretation of 
quantum mechanics opposing the standard position in that subject. Those two changes 
were a turning point in his personal and scientific life. In the McCarthy period, Bohm 
could not survive in American academia. The first scientific position he was able to get 
was in Brazil, but he never enjoyed his 3-year Brazilian exile. However, having had his 
passport confiscated by American officials, it was as a Brazilian citizen that Bohm left 
Brazil in January 1955 to take a position at the Technion in Haifa. Two years later he went 
to England, where he finally found a convenient place to pursue his research for the rest of 
his prolonged exile. His main scientific interests remained in the unorthodox subject he 
began to work on in 1951, but from 1970 on he shifted his approach to what he called 
“implicit order.” 1 
 
At the beginning of the 1950s, the context in which physics was being practiced 
was not favorable to research on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Bohm’s causal 
interpretation was poorly received among physicists; in some important cases it was even 
received with hostility, and just a few people supported his ideas. Both the vicissitudes of 
Bohm’s life and the poor initial reception of his causal interpretation have attracted the 
attention of historians, philosophers, and physicists, and some of them have blamed the 
former for the latter. “The political atmosphere in the US at that time did not help rational 
debate and in consequence there was little discussion and the interpretation was generally 
ignored for reasons that had more to do with politics than science,” stated the physicist 
Basil Hiley, who was Bohm’s assistant. F. David Peat, a science writer and former Bohm’s 
collaborator, also found the political explanation for Bohm’s unfavorable reception 
appealing, but limited its force to the Princeton physics community. The historians Russel 
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Olwell and Shawn Mullet, in their interesting and comprehensive studies of Bohm’s 
prosecution under McCarthyism and of Princeton’s procedures towards Bohm, blamed 
Bohm’s Brazilian exile for the poor reception of Bohm’s causal interpretation.2 The 
interest in such issues has grown probably because the second half of the 20th century 
witnessed a dramatic change in that context. From the early 1970s on, the subject matter of 
Bohm’s works – the interpretation and foundations of quantum mechanics – became a field 
of intensive research; Bohm’s first proposal, slightly modified to so-called Bohmian 
mechanics, enjoyed a larger audience in the 1990s; and, by the end of the century, he was 
considered one of the most gifted protagonists in the field of research whose creation he 
contributed. A sign of the prestige accorded Bohm and the field of the foundations of 
quantum mechanics can be found in the volume in honor of the centenary edition of 
Physical Review which includes commentaries on and reprints from the most important 
papers ever published in the leading journal of American physics. Chapter 14, edited by 
Sheldon Goldstein and Joel Lebowitz, is entitled “Quantum Mechanics”, but all of its 
papers, including Bohm’s paper on the causal interpretation, concern foundations of 
quantum mechanics. A photo of Bohm opens the chapter. Thus, the initial poor reception 
of Bohm’s ideas requires historical explanation.3 
 
My main point is that in order to put Bohm’s physical ideas into its cultural 
context, one needs to include in that context not only his persona as a person prosecuted by 
McCarthyism and later on his Brazilian exile, but also the ways in which the subject matter 
of Bohm’s work, the foundations of quantum mechanics, were being practiced at the time. 
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By this I mean both the role played among physicists by the dominant view at the time, i.e. 
the interpretation of complementarity, as well as the ways in which physicists included or 
excluded, in their research agendas and teaching duties, issues related to the foundations 
and interpretation of quantum mechanics. In putting scientific ideas in their cultural 
contexts I neither juxtapose them nor find strong causal links between them; as remarked 
by Peter Galison and Andrew Warwick, “understanding science as a cultural activity […] 
means learning to identify and to interpret the complicated and particular collection of 
shared actions, values, signs, beliefs and practices by which groups of scientists make 
sense of their daily lives and work.” These authors also noted, “this kind of approach has 
already been widely applied to the history of the experimental sciences, but the literature 
on the theoretical side is much less developed.” This note affects the present study, since 
no connections between theories and experiments related to the foundations of quantum 
mechanics had been made in the early 1950s, and we need to understand the reception of a 
theoretical approach in a context lacking experimental links. The suggested approach of 
science as a cultural activity calls attention for the role of pedagogy in the production of 
science, an aspect I take into account in this paper.4 
 
To present my case, I will proceed along two fronts. I will firstly focus on a 
segment of Bohm’s vicissitudes, his Brazilian exile, which is not yet well analyzed in the 
available literature, to argue that Bohm found support in Brazil for his research program. 
This part is also a contribution to filling a gap pointed out by Alexis De Greiff and David 
Kaiser; according to them, despite several recent studies, the problem of the construction 
of knowledge outside the leading centers of calculation and, consequently, of the 
globalization of knowledge, remains woefully understudied.5 Bohm continued to work 
consistently on the causal interpretation, kept in contact with colleagues abroad, discussed 
his proposal with visitors from Europe and the United States, and profited from 
collaboration with Brazilian physicists in achieving some of the published results on the 
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causal interpretation. Bohm’s deeds in Brazil did not match the views he expressed in the 
letters he exchanged at the time, the latter reflecting his personality and the vicissitudes he 
faced rather than being a reliable picture of his Brazilian stay. Additionally, I will show 
that Bohm would have faced elsewhere many of the obstacles that he faced in Brazil while 
working on causal interpretation. The second part of the paper brings out more about his 
activities in the 1950s, moving from the examination of Bohm’s Brazilian exile to other 
dimensions related to the reception of his interpretation. The focus of the analysis is on the 
dispute between supporters of causal and complementarity interpretations, and, in 
particular, on the discourse of the several participants in the dispute. Bohm’s proposal 
represented the first alternative to the complementarity interpretation, and for this reason it 
was seen as a major challenge to the established interpretation. The balance of the dispute, 
in the 1950s, was favorable to supporters of complementarity, since they succeeded in 
characterizing the dispute as being of a philosophical nature, meaning that its subject was 
not a matter for professional physicists. I will show how the fact that Bohm and his 
collaborators did not get any new results both influenced, and was influenced by, that 
characterization. The label of philosophical controversy will be framed in a broader 
context related to the training of physicists in quantum mechanics and their research 
agenda. The fact that the various interpretations were absent from courses and textbooks 
on quantum mechanics, and the idea that the interpretation of quantum mechanics was a 
question already solved by the founding fathers of quantum mechanics reinforced the 
opinion, tacitly shared by most of the physicists, that foundational and interpretative 
questions were not worthy of being included in physics research agenda.  
 
 David Bohm and his supporters challenged what Max Jammer called the “almost 
unchallenged monocracy of the Copenhagen school in the philosophy of quantum 
mechanics.” 6 I will discuss the possible meanings and implications of Jammer’s 
characterization, taking into consideration available studies on history and philosophy of 
quantum mechanics. Additionally, I will sketch two comparative essays: the first is related 
to the role of the McCarthyist climate in different contexts, while the second compares the 
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reception of Bohm’s causal interpretation with the interpretation suggested by Hugh 
Everett, in the second half of the 1950s. 
 
Hence, I conclude that when one looks for a balanced view of the poor reception 
enjoyed by the causal interpretation in the 1950s, factors other than the vicissitudes faced 
by Bohm emerge as more influential. These concern the way in which complementarity 
supporters reacted to Bohm’s challenge, physicists practiced the foundations of quantum 
physics, and Bohm and his collaborators achieved research results. He could not find much 
support in that context, and for the same reason, I suggest that the later resonance of 
Bohm’s ideas among physicists, and even his persona in the 1990s, only can be understood 
in terms of the changed cultural context from the 1970s on. In addition, I will show that by 
this ruse of history, Bohm’s hidden variable interpretation, so poorly received in the 1950s, 
produced a byproduct which has been the main scientific achievement behind the changed 
landscape of the research on the foundations of quantum mechanics: the Bell theorem, 
published in 1965 by the Irish physicist John S. Bell. 
 
1. BRAZILIAN EXILE 
The vicissitudes of a life during the Cold War 
 
The beginning of the 1950s was a turning point in Bohm’s personal and scientific 
life, when he was diverted from the feverish path of a promising career in post-war 
American physics. The House Un-American Activities Committee [HUAC] subpoenaed 
him to talk about his activities and links with the Communist Party during the war at the 
Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. He decided not to answer on these activities, claiming 
the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees protection against self-incrimination. He was 
indicted by a jury for contempt of Congress, arrested, freed on bail, and eventually 
acquitted on May 31, 1951. In this acquittal, Bohm was favored by a decision of the 
Supreme Court reasserting the rights of the Fifth Amendment for those who were being 
called before congressional committees. However, his personal damages were irreversible. 
At the beginning of the trial, Princeton University had placed him on paid leave, but when 
the moment to renew his appointment came, in June 1951, Princeton did not reappoint him. 
Princeton’s decision still stirs up controversy and passion. John Archibald Wheeler wrote 
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in his autobiography, after reminding the reader that it was he who had invited Bohm to 
Princeton, that “since the Bohm affair – which understandably polarized the campus – 
occurred while I was away, I played no part in it. Had I been there, I’m not sure I would 
have been outspoken in Bohm’s defense. […] The university was gauche in its manner of 
dealing with Bohm, yet I could sympathize with its goal, to preserve its reputation as a 
center of unbiased scholarly inquiry, not the home of blind loyalty to one ideology or 
another.”7 
 
Feeling that he could not get another academic position in McCarthy’s America, 
Bohm began to look for a position abroad. Especially in his attempt to get a position in 
Manchester,8 he was supported by Albert Einstein, to whom he had become very close 
while discussing the interpretation of quantum mechanics. When Manchester did not hire 
him Brazil entered Bohm’s scientific life, and not completely by chance. By that time, 
Princeton had graduated a small group of Brazilian physicists, and had become a meeting 
place for Brazilian physicists in the US [See photo, enclosed]. The Brazilians were Jayme 
Tiomno, who had graduated under John Wheeler & Eugene Wigner in 1950; José Leite 
Lopes, who had studied under Wolfgang Pauli & Josef Jauch in 1946 and been named a 
Guggenheim Fellow in 1949; and Walter Schützer, who had completed a Master degree in 
1949. Bohm was one of the readers of Tiomno’s doctoral dissertation and served as the 
chairman of his dissertation committee when Wigner was away.9 Thus Bohm was already 
close to Brazilian physicists in Princeton. He asked Tiomno about job possibilities in 
Brazil, and Tiomno invited him to the University of São Paulo. The project of Bohm’s 
going to Brazil engaged several people, with recommendation letters from Einstein and 
Oppenheimer, among others. The support of Abrahão de Moraes, then the head of the 
Physics Department, and Aroldo de Azevedo, a geographer who referred Bohm’s 
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application to the university board, were instrumental.10 Later, to keep Bohm safely in his 
Brazilian position, de Moraes asked Einstein to send letters for use with the Brazilian 
authorities, including President Getúlio Vargas.11 
 
Brazilian exile and citizenship 
 
Although it welcomed him, Brazil was never Bohm’s first choice; it was the only 
possibility at a moment when he had no academic position and was scared of the growing 
McCarthyism in the United States. Bohm’s Brazilian exile would be a period of marked 
uneasiness, as evidenced in his letters to Einstein, Hanna Loewy, Miriam Yevick, and 
Melba Phillips. He wrote, “I am afraid that Brazil and I can never agree,”12 and reading 
those letters, one might conclude that Bohm’s troubles in Brazil were mainly due to 
characteristics of the country – noise, dirt, heat – and what seemed to him a dullness in the 
intellectual atmosphere.13 Bohm went to Brazil an innocent and, as soon as he arrived, he 
wrote optimistically to Einstein, “The university is rather disorganized, but this will cause 
no trouble in the study of theoretical physics. There are several good students here, with 
whom it will be good to work.” Later, however, he expressed both his surprise and lack of 
prior knowledge about the country: “The country here is very poor and not as advanced 
technically as the U.S., nor is it as clean.”14  
 
Bohm arrived in Brazil on October 10, 1951. One month later he would suffer a 
new blow, when American officials confiscated his passport and told him that he could 
only retrieve it to return to his native country.15 Bohm was worried about the meaning of 
that ruling, and he expressed it in the first letter he wrote to Einstein, “Now what alarms 
me about this is that I do not know what it means. The best possible interpretation is that 
they simply do not want me to leave Brazil, and the worst is that they are planning to carry 
                                                
10 Record number 816/51 [microfilm], Archives of the Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras, USP. 
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12 David Bohm to Hanna Loewy, 6 Oct 1953, BP (C.39). 
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Einstein, 3 Feb 1954. Albert Einstein Archives. 
14 David Bohm to Albert Einstein, Nov 1951, BP (C.10-11), emphasis added. 
15 One should remark that David Fox, a colleague of Bohms at Berkeley, faced a similar constraint in Israel 
but refused to deliver his passport, and did not lose his citizenship. Stirling Colgate to George Owen (Deputy 
Director, Visa Office  US State Dept), 4 Nov 1966, BP (C.8). 
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me back because perhaps they are reopening this whole dirty business again. The 
uncertainty is certainly very disturbing, as it makes planning for the next few years very 
difficult.”16 Bohm’s stay in Brazil, without a passport, changed his mood; he wrote to 
Phillips, a close friend: “Ever since I lost the passport, I have been depressed and uneasy, 
particularly since I was counting very much on this trip to Europe as an antidote to all the 
problems that I have mentioned.”17 Bohm’s response to the confiscation of his passport was 
to seek Brazilian citizenship.18 
 
The events behind Bohm’s exile in Brazil reveal the network of international 
solidarity that was able to back him at a crucial moment of his life. One knot of the 
network was the intellectual brilliance and moral strength of the name of Albert Einstein. 
The other knot was the confluence of diverse factors forming the Brazilian scientific 
context. The role played by the young community of physicists was instrumental, but this 
support would not have succeeded without a political and institutional basis. Brazil had 
had, since 1934, a young but autonomous university, the USP. That such a university could 
exist was a testament to the power of the regional elite in the state of São Paulo, who 
sought cultural hegemony after the defeat of their state in the 1932 rebellion.19 At the time 
that Bohm went to Brazil, the country was experiencing a new democracy which arose 
from the anti-dictatorial struggle of the Brazilian people and also from the participation of 
Brazil in World War II on the Allied side, which had involved sending troops to the battles 
in Italy.20 Only by considering that scientific, political and institutional context can one 
grasp how it was possible for the most important Brazilian university to welcome an 
American scientist tainted as a Communist by McCarthyism. Bohm’s double identity as 
Marxist and Jew was not unfavorable in Brazil; on the contrary, this condition probably 
                                                
16 David Bohm to Albert Einstein, Dec 1951, BP (C.10-11). 
17 David Bohm to Melba Phillips, n.d., BP (C.46 - C.48). 
18 After Bohm became a Brazilian citizen, the US State Department decreed that Bohm had lost his American 
citizenship. He only recovered it in 1986, after a lawsuit. 
19 It [creation of the USP] meant a political choice of São Paulo, after its defeat in the Constitutionalist 
Revolution of 1932, betting on science and culture as sources of its political redemption. Shozo Motoyama, 
Os principais marcos históricos da ciência e tecnologia no Brasil, Revista da Sociedade Brasileira de 
História da Ciência, 1 (1985), 41-49, on 44. 
20 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964; an experiment in democracy (New York, 1967); and 
Antonio M. de Almeida Jr., Do declínio do Estado Novo ao suicídio de Getúlio Vargas, Boris Fausto, 
História geral da civilização brasileira, tomo III, vol. 3: O Brasil republicano  sociedade e política (1930-
1964) (Rio de Janeiro, 1996), 225-255. 
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enlarged the desire of people to help him. The fragile Brazilian democracy initially 
legalized the Communist Party, but when the party was later banished from public life, 
Communists continued to play a role in Brazilian life. Indeed, among the Communist 
intellectuals one cand find the names of Jorge Amado and Graciliano Ramos, writers; 
Cândido Portinari, painter; Caio Prado Jr., historian; Mário Schönberg, physicist; and 
Oscar Niemeyer, architect.21 
 
In South America, Brazil had been a “terre d’accueil” for Jews since the beginning 
of the 20th century, owing to the weakness of anti-Semitic feelings. The most important 
literary recognition of this tolerance may have come from the Austrian Jewish writer 
Stefan Zweig (1881-1942), who argued, in 1941, that Brazil could be a land of future to the 
Jews persecuted in Europe. A sociological study about the Jewish community in São Paulo 
seems to confirm and explain that tolerance. Rattner identified the social and economic 
conditions associated with the exceptional phase of development in the metropolitan area 
of São Paulo as factors favorable to the integration of the Jewish community in that city, 
before and after World War II. This does not deny, however, the existence of anti-Semitic 
features in the nationalist politics of the dictatorial regime of the “Estado Novo” (1930-
1945); and the weakness of anti-Semitic feelings in Brazil should not lead one to endorse 
the myth of Brazilian racial democracy as far as its African descendants are concerned.22 
 
So, it is not by chance that one of the most gifted Brazilian physicists – Mario 
Schönberg – a member of the same Physics Department into which Bohm was accepted, 
was a Jew who had been a representative of the Communist party in the state parliament 
after World War II. Olwell remarks that “the political situation in Brazil was by no means 
free of fear either,” and cites Schönberg’s arrest in 1948. However, to understand how 
Bohm could teach at USP while he could not teach at Princeton, we need to look closely at 
the peculiarities of the fragile Brazilian democracy at that time. There were arrests, even 
illegal ones, of political activists. Unions and the Communist Party were closed down. 
                                                
21 Leôncio M. Rodrigues, O PCB: os dirigentes e a organização, Boris Fausto (ref. 26), 361-443, on 412. 
22 Stefan Zweig, Brazil: a land of the future (Riverside, 2000), [1st ed. 1941]; Henrique Rattner, Tradição e 
mudança (a comunidade judaica em São Paulo) (São Paulo, 1977); Maria L. T. Carneiro, O anti-semitismo 
na era Vargas (1930-1945) (São Paulo; Thomas Skidmore, Black into white; race and nationality in 
Brazilian thought (Durham, 1993). I am grateful to Marcos Chor and Augusto Videira for some remarks 
about the literature on this subject. 
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However, Communist intellectuals, like the physicist Schönberg and others, could keep 
their positions at the universities. This could not have happened 20 years later, during the 
military dictatorship [1964-1985], when Schönberg was arrested and forced to retire by 
presidential decree. Obliged retirement was also the fate of liberals such as the physicists 
Tiomno, Leite Lopes, the sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who would later be 
President of Brazil, and the economist Celso Furtado.23 
 
Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics 
 
I need now to present Bohms hidden variable proposal to get a better idea about 
the issues at stake, and as his proposal was closely connected to the models he built, we 
need to have a rough idea of them. He depicted quantum systems, such as electrons, as 
particles with well defined positions, and associated them with a general function to be 
written in the form ψ = R exp (iS/ħ). Substituting such a function in the Schrödinger 
equation and exploiting analogies between the equations resulting of this substitution and 
the Hamilton-Jacobi equations of classical mechanics, he derived that such electrons 
should have a well defined momentum given by the expression p = ∇S(x). In addition, the 
electrons were submitted to a quantum potential U(x) = - ħ2∇2R/2mR, in addition to the 
potentials known from classical physics. In this model, P = ψ(x)2 gives the probability 
density of a statistical ensemble of particle positions. At this point, one should note that 
electrons in Bohms models have well defined positions and momenta; thus, they have 
continuous and well defined trajectories. As the complementarity interpretation of quantum 
mechanics prevents the simultaneous definition of such variables, their joint existences are 
the hidden variables in Bohms models. They are hidden in the usual interpretation of 
quantum mechanics. Bohm went ahead and developed his approach in a twofold 
movement. He considered that the measurement devices also included well defined 
positions and momenta, and obtained the observable results writing and analyzing the 
Hamiltonian of the coupling between such devices and the systems. In the second 
movement, he applied those ideas to detailed calculations of a number of simple quantum 
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systems such as stationary states, transitions between stationary states, including scattering 
problems, and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen gedankenexperiment. To achieve results 
compatible with those from quantum mechanics, he considered that a photon in its 
interaction with matter was not a particles, but a bunch of electromagnetic waves. 
The results Bohm obtained were impressive. For phenomena in which relativistic 
considerations were not necessary, his treatment led to a full equivalence with usual 
quantum mechanical predictions, but using models based on assumptions in flagrant 
conflict with the complementarity interpretation of quantum mechanics. Bohms 
interpretation departed from complementarity, or the usual interpretation as he called it, 
in its essential assumption, i.e. that the most complete possible specification of an 
individual system is in terms of a wave function that determines only probable results of 
actual measurement processes. In addition, he promised that some assumptions of his 
models could be relaxed and could permit successful predictions different from quantum 
mechanics in domains in which this theory was facing difficulties or new phenomena, such 
as the myriad of new particles recently discovered as well as infinities in quantum 
electrodynamics. According to Bohm, the usual mathematical formulation seems to lead 
to insoluble difficulties when it is extrapolated into the domain of distances of the order of 
10-13 cm or less. It is therefore entirely possible that the interpretation suggested here may 
be needed for the resolution of these difficulties. Finally, we should note that Bohm was 
aware that his quantum potential exhibited strange features, such as the instantaneous 
propagation of interactions in systems with many bodies. However, he hoped that feature 
would disappear in a future relativistic generalization of his models; this hope was also a 
commitment to find such a generalization.24 
 
Even before Bohm’s papers appeared in print, Albert Einstein and Wolfgang Pauli 
remarked to him that Louis de Broglie had suggested a similar approach in 1927, a fact of 
which Bohm was not aware. Pauli’s remarks were more critical, for a number of reasons. 
He had criticized de Broglie’s approach at that time, and de Broglie had given up his own 
proposal; now it was up to Bohm to face the same criticism. In addition, Pauli’s remarks 
stirred up a dispute regarding priorities. Pauli’s criticism was that de Broglie’s proposal 
                                                
24 Bohm (ref. 1). 
 13
fitted Max Born’s probabilistic interpretation of the ψ function only for elastic collisions, 
and illustrated his argument with the scattering of particles by a rotator, a problem which 
had been solved by Enrico Fermi a year before. Pauli showed that de Broglie’s proposal 
did not provide the rotator stationary states before and after the scattering, and had 
considered this failure something intrinsic to de Broglie’s assumption of particles with 
determined trajectories in the usual space-time. Pauli’s updated criticism challenged Bohm 
to exhibit the strengths of his approach.25 
 
Pauli’s criticisms were addressed to the first version of Bohm’s paper, which Bohm 
had sent to him asking for critical comments. Bohm took into account Pauli’s remarks and 
gave up some features of his models and worked out to their full consequences his first 
ideas, and these changes made the difference in comparison with de Broglie’s earlier 
works. The first version of Bohm’s paper did not survive, but one can have a glance at it in 
Bohm’s letter responding to Pauli’s criticisms: “I hope that this new copy of will answer 
some of the objections to my previous manuscript. […] To sum up my answer to your 
criticisms […], I believe that they were based on the excessively abstract assumptions of a 
plane wave of infinite extent for the electrons Ψ function. As I point out in section 7 of 
paper I, if you had chosen an incident wave packet instead, then after the collision is over, 
the electron ends up in one of the outgoing wave packets, so that a stationary state is once 
more obtained.” Pauli did not read the second manuscript as he considered it too long, 
which Bohm did not like: “If I write a paper so ‘short’ that you will read it, then I cannot 
answer all of your objections. If I answer all of your objections, then the paper will be too 
‘long’ for you to read.” Bohm warned Pauli – “I really think that it is your duty to read 
these papers carefully” – but as a precaution wrote a long letter to Pauli explaining his 
views and the improvements he had made to his models. One of these letters summarizes 
these improvements:26 
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In the second version of the paper, these objections are all answered in detail. The 
second version differs considerably from the first version. In particular, in the 
second version, I do not need to use “molecular chaos.” You refer to this 
interpretation as de Broglie’s. It is true that he suggested it first, but he gave it up 
because he came to the erroneous conclusion that it does not work. The essential 
new point that I have added is to show in detail (especially by working out the 
theory of measurement in paper II) that his interpretation leads to all of the results 
of the usual interpretation. Section 7 of paper I is also new [transitions between 
stationary states – the Franck-Hertz experiment], and gives a similar treatment to 
the more restricted problem of the interaction of two particles, showing that after 
the interaction is over, the hydrogen atom is left in a definite “quantum state” while 
the outgoing scattered particle has a corresponding definite value for its energy. 
 
Eventually, Pauli studied in detail Bohm’s papers, “I just received your long letter 
of November 20 and I also studied more thoroughly the details of your paper.” Together 
with this letter, the only from Pauli of which the manuscript survives, there was an 
appendix with some calculations on what Pauli called “de Broglie’ ‘streamline-quantum-
force’ image.” Bohm won the dispute with Pauli, whom many considered the foremost 
critic among physicists in the 20th century. Pauli conceded that Bohm’s model was 
logically consistent: “I do not see any longer the possibility of any logical contradiction as 
long as your results agree completely with those of the usual wave mechanics and as long 
as no means is given to measure the values of your hidden parameters both in the 
measuring apparatus and in the observed system.” Pauli finished his statement with a 
caveat that would haunt Bohm and collaborators for many years, “as far as the whole 
matter stands now, your ‘extra wave-mechanical predictions’ are still a check, which 
cannot be cashed.” Pauli would not end his opposition to the hidden variable interpretation, 
as we will see later, but for the moment, it is interesting to remark that in this very 
appendix was one of his later criticisms: “to ascribe Ψ (x) ‘physical reality’ and not to ϕ 
(p) destroys a transformation group of the theory.” For Bohm, it was more difficult to settle 
the priority dispute with de Broglie, reiterated by Pauli, than to answer Pauli’s physics 
criticism.27 
 
Louis de Broglie had been working with the idea of double solution, that is, the 
waves resulting from the Schrödinger equation pilot the particles, but particles themselves 
are singularities of the waves. On the eve of the 1927 Solvay council he gave up this idea 
                                                
27 Pauli to Bohm, 03 Dec 1951, plus an appendix, Pauli, (ref. 25), 436-441. 
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due to its mathematical difficulties, and presented his report to that meeting with just the 
“pilot wave,” adding particles as objects external to the theory. Since the 1927 meeting he 
had given up his approach and adhered to the complementarity interpretation. Bohm was 
right in remarking that de Broglie had not carried his ideas to a logical conclusion, but it 
was also clear that de Broglie had a share, previously acquired, in the idea of the hidden 
variables in quantum mechanics. Bohm resisted accepting it. To Pauli he wrote this 
interesting analogy, just after summarizing to him what he had added to de Broglie’s ideas: 
“If one man finds a diamond and then throws it away because he falsely concludes that it is 
a valueless stone, and if this stone is later found by another man who recognize its true 
value, would you not say that the stone belongs to the second man? I think the same 
applies to this interpretation of the quantum theory.28 
 
Eventually, however, Bohm found a diplomatic way, which was suggested by 
Pauli, to recognize de Broglie’s priority while maintaining the superiority of his own work: 
“I have changed the introduction of my paper so as to give due credit to de Broglie, and 
have stated that he gave up the theory too soon (as suggested in your letter).” In addition to 
changing the introduction he added an appendix to the second part of his paper for “a 
discussion of interpretations of the quantum theory proposed by de Broglie and Rosen,” 
and also rebutted Pauli’s criticisms. By the time Bohm’s papers appeared in print, de 
Broglie was again shifting his own position, this time coming back to his 1926-1927 
approaches, and together with his assistant Jean-Pierre Vigier, would become the most 
important of Bohm’s allies in the hidden variable campaign.29 
 
Brazilian activities and the reception of the causal interpretation 
 
In some recent accounts, Brazilian exile was, for Bohm, a period in which he 
abandoned research or was completely blocked from pursuing it. We will see later how far 
from reality these descriptions were, but for now let us cite just a few of these accounts. 
Jessica Wang wrote that McCarthyism forced him to give up research for several years. 
Later, she slightly modified her views: “Unhappy with the quality of intellectual life at the 
                                                
28 For the evolution of de Broglies ideas, Louis de Broglie, Nouvelles perspectives en microphysique , (Paris, 
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University of São Paolo [sic] and beset with physical ailments, Bohm searched for a way 
out.” Olwell recognized that “Bohm continued to work on questions of theoretical 
physics,” but he did not comment on the results of that work, and added “in isolation.” 
Olwell considered that Israel, in contrast to Brazil, “was a supportive place for Bohm’s 
work in physics,” and quoted his work with Yakir Aharonov. Nevertheless, Olwell did not 
take into account that Bohm’s main work with Aharonov (Aharonov–Bohm effect) did not 
concern the causal interpretation of quantum mechanics. It was rather the proposal of a 
new physical effect derived from quantum mechanics but still not recognized by physicists 
at the time. Olwell, taking correctly into account the level of experimental physics in 
Brazil, wrote that “the Brazilian physics community lacked the kind of tools Bohm had 
used as a graduate student in experimental physics.” But he did not consider that, since 
before leaving the United States, Bohm had been completely dedicated to the problem of 
the foundations of quantum mechanics, a field of theoretical physics with no contact with 
experiments in the 1950s. Experiments in this field came out later.30 In contrast to these 
views, and considering that almost all his scientific interests were focused on the causal 
interpretation, I will argue that Bohm developed an intense and large scientific activity in 
Brazil. He discussed his proposal with foreign visitors, like Richard Feynman, Isidor Rabi, 
Léon Rosenfeld, Mario Bunge, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Herbert Anderson, Donald 
Kerst, Marcos Moshinsky, A. Medina, and Guido Beck, and Brazilian physicists like 
Schönberg and Leite Lopes. And yet, most important of all, in Brazil his work led not only 
to some individual publications but also to papers in collaboration with foreign visitors, 
such as the Frenchman Jean-Pierre Vigier, who went to Brazil for three months especially 
to work with Bohm, the American Ralph Schiller, who had been a student of the 
cosmologist Peter Bergmann at Syracuse University and stayed in Brazil for two years as 
Bohm’s assistant, and the Brazilians Tiomno and Walther Schützer.  
 
Bohm’s main hopes for getting an ally among foreign visitors in Brazil were 
directed towards Richard Feynman, who was spending his sabbatical year in 1951 at the 
CBPF in Rio de Janeiro.31 Bohm liked the way Feynman initially reacted to his talk: “At 
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the scientific conference at Belo Horizonte, I gave a talk on the quantum theory, which was 
well received. Feynman was convinced that it is a logical possibility, and that it may lead 
to something new.” His interaction with Feynman reinforced his conviction that he needed 
to talk with physicists in order to convince them, and that in Brazil, without a passport, 
everything became more difficult. How large was Bohm’s bet on Feynman can be inferred 
from this letter to Hanna Loewy, which is also evidence of Bohm’s distrust of the current 
trends of physics at the time: 
Right now, I am in Rio giving a talk on the quantum theory. About the only person 
here who really understands is Feynman, and I am gradually winning him over. He 
already concedes that it is a logical possibility. Also, I am trying to get him out of 
his depressing trap down long and dreary calculations on a theory [procedures of 
renormalization in Quantum Field Theory] that is known to be of no use. Instead 
maybe he can be gotten interested in speculation about new ideas, as he used to do, 
before Bethe and the rest of the calculations got hold of him. 
 
Bohm’s hopes were unfounded, since “in his physics Feynman always stayed close 
to experiments and showed little interest in theories that could not be tested 
experimentally.” As we have discussed, at the time the hidden variable approach had no 
connections with experiments. Indeed, the only reference Feynman made to hidden 
variables approach was to include it as one of the possible avenues for the development of 
theoretical physics, in a general paper published in a Brazilian science journal. This minor 
reference was too little for Bohm’s hopes.32 Guido Beck, who was Heisenberg’s assistant, 
and a refugee from the Nazi regime, was living in Brazil at the time Bohm stayed there. 
Bohm found Beck a supportive person for his scientific activities, even if Beck did not 
share a belief in the causal interpretation. Beck defended Bohm against the acrimonious 
criticisms of Rosenfeld – especially the comparison between Bohm and a tourist - and 
maintained that one should wait to see what physical results Bohm would be able to get. 
He was also instrumental in Bohm’s relationship with the CNPq’s scientific director, Costa 
Ribeiro, concerning funding for Bohm’s research.33 The Argentine Mario Bunge, who had 
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been a doctoral student of Guido Beck in Buenos Aires, is a lesser-known case of adhesion 
to the causal interpretation. He read Bohm’s papers and became motivated to work in such 
a direction. Bohm replied to the letter in which he asked questions about the hidden 
variable models with an invitation to come to São Paulo. Bunge spent one year working 
with Bohm, but in spite of the good conversation, nothing came out. Indeed, Bunge 
attacked a problem which was more difficult than he had thought before, that is, the 
“Bohmization” of relativistic quantum mechanics and elimination of infinitudes in 
quantum electrodynamics. Besides Bunge, other causal interpretation supporters 
unsuccessfully tackled the same problem. In the middle of the 1960s, disenchanted with 
the hidden variable interpretation, he would give it up, as we will see later.34 Bohm enjoyed 
conversation with Feynman, Beck, and Bunge, in addition to the cooperative work with 
Vigier and Schiller; however, his feelings were different with other visitors such as Isidor 
Rabi, Léon Rosenfeld, and von Weizsäcker. 
We had an international Congress of Physics. […] 8 physicists from the States 
(including Wigner, Rabi, Herb, Kerst, and others), 10 from Mexico, Argentina, and 
Bolivia, aside few from Europe, were brought here by the UNESCO and by the 
Brazilian National Res. Council. […] The Americans are clearly very competent in 
their own fields, but very naïve and reactionary in other fields. […] I gave a talk on 
my hidden variables, but ran into much opposition, especially from Rabi. Most of it 
made no real sense.35 
 
Bohm complemented his description of the meeting by formulating Rabi’s view 
thus: “As yet, your theory is just based on hopes, so why bother us with it until it produces 
results. The hidden variables are at present analogous to the ‘angels’ which people 
introduced in the Middle Ages to explain things.” We can be sure that Bohm produced a 
faithful description of the content of Rabi’s intervention, even if the proceedings of the 
meeting do not include the reference to the medieval angels. Indeed, according to Rabi, “I 
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do not see how the causal interpretation gives us any line to work on other than the use of 
the concepts of quantum theory. Every time a concept of quantum theory comes along, you 
can say yes, it would do the same thing as this in the causal interpretation. But I would like 
to see a situation where the thing turns around, when you predict something and we say, 
yes, the quantum theory can do it too.” Bohm’s main answer was to compare the current 
context with the debates on atomism in the 19th century: “[E]xactly the same criticism that 
you are making was made against the atomic theory – that nobody had seen the atoms, 
nobody knew what they were like, and the deduction about them was gotten from the 
perfect gas law, which was already known.” The “much opposition” Bohm referred to 
included questions related to the relativistic generalization of his model and its 
experimental predictions. Indeed, Anderson, from Chicago, wanted to know how Bohm 
could recover the quantum feature of indiscernibility of particles, i.e., the exclusion 
principle; the Mexican physicist Medina asked if Bohm’s approach could “predict the 
existence of a spin of a particle as in field theory;” the Brazilian Leite Lopes and the 
American Kerst called for experiments which could contrast both interpretations; and 
Moshinsky, from the University of Mexico, posed the question whether there is “reaction 
of the motion of the particle on the wave field.” Bohm’s answer to Anderson is interesting 
in that he emphasized that the causal interpretation only needed to reproduce the 
experimental predictions of quantum theory, but not each one of its concepts, “All I wish 
to do is to obtain the same experimental results from this theory as are obtained from the 
usual theories, that is, it is not necessary for me to reproduce every statement of the usual 
interpretation. […] You may take the exclusion principle as a principle to explain these 
experiments [levels of energy]. But another principle would also explain them.36 
 
Rosenfeld was one of the main opponents of the causal interpretation, and for this 
reason, I will consider his case in the second part of this paper. For the moment, however, I 
remark only that conversation between Bohm and him on quantum mechanics would 
always be harsh. As he wrote to Bohm, “I certainly shall not enter into any controversy 
with you or anybody else on the subject of complementarity, for the simple reason that 
there is not the slightest controversial point about it.” Rosenfeld went to Brazil especially 
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motivated to discuss the epistemological problems of quantum mechanics. He gave a 
course on classical statistical mechanics in Rio de Janeiro, published papers in Portuguese 
on the epistemological lessons of quantum mechanics, and gave a talk in São Paulo on the 
non-controversial issue of complementarity. Bohm was not completely disappointed with 
the debate, at least as he reported to Aage Bohr: Prof. Rosenfeld visited Brazil recently, 
and we had a rather hot and extended discussion in São Paulo, following a seminar that he 
gave on the foundations of the quantum theory. However, I think that we both learned 
something from the seminar. Rosenfeld admitted to me afterwards that he could at least see 
that my point of view was a possible one, although he personally did not like it.37 The 
discussions between von Weizsäcker and Bohm left contradictory records. The German 
physicist recognized in 1971 that debates with Bohm on hidden variables were at the origin 
of his motivation to work on what he called “complementarity logic,” which is a case of 
many-valued logic. Bohm, however, was strongly influenced by the fact that von 
Weizsäcker allied himself in São Paulo with a group of physicists with whom Bohm was in 
dispute at the Physics Department, a dispute rather more related to positions and funding 
than to Bohm’s causal interpretation. He saw von Weizsäcker’s activities as a plot, and 
asked support from his friends, the physicist Philip Morrison and the mathematician 
Miriam Yevick, warning that “Nazis [are] taking over Brazilian physics,” and suggesting, 
“try to see what you can do about lining up publicity against Weissacre [sic], but don’t do 
a thing till I say ‘go’.” To Guido Beck, he detailed who was in the group involved: “I am 
writing you to let you know that Marcello and Stammreich, apparently acting on behalf of 
the Weissacker – Leal [sic] group are doing their best to annoy me.” Marcello is the 
Brazilian physicist Marcello Damy de Souza Santos. He worked with cosmic rays and had 
built in 1950 the USP’s betatron, which was the first accelerator to be used in Latin 
America. The German spectroscopist Hans Stammreich had migrated to Brazil in the 
1940s, and was a professor of physics at USP, and “Leal” refers to the brothers Jorge and 
Paulo Leal Ferreira, Brazilian physicists who eventually founded the Instituto de Física 
Teórica, in São Paulo. According to Bohm, Damy’s arguments involved ideological 
considerations, since he had “been telling everyone here that (a) I am Communist, (b) My 
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theory is Marxist,” to which Bohm added, “both statements are, of course, nonsensical.” 
As the dispute concerned the hiring of Bohm’s assistants, he wrote that “Stammreich [had] 
accused [him] of filling the place with North Americans;” but added, “I was warmly 
defended by several Brazilians, however, and my proposal was passed by a large 
majority.” Apparently, prosaic disputes took the place of more fruitful discussions between 
Bohm and von Weizsäcker.38 
 
The physics produced by Bohm in Brazil was relevant to the development of the 
causal program, as one can infer from later accounts by the supporters of the program. In 
fact, Bohm’s papers with Tiomno & Schiller, and his paper with Vigier, were always 
considered by Bohm as the main achievements of the causal program at that time.39 With 
Vigier, Bohm met Wolfgang Pauli’s early criticism that Bohm had included an arbitrary 
element in the causal interpretation, equaling its probability distribution to the  function 
that satisfied the Schrödinger’s equation of quantum mechanics.40 Bohm had tried to solve 
the question by himself, without success,41 and Louis de Broglie and Vigier had been 
sensitive to that criticism since the beginning of 1952.42 In 1954, Bohm and Vigier were 
able to prove that, under some general conditions, any function could become a solution of 
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the Schrödinger equation. To get that result, they used the analogy between Bohm’s 
approach and the hydrodynamic approach to quantum mechanics, suggested by Erwin 
Madelung in 1926, and embedded the microscopic quantum particles in a subquantum 
medium with random fluctuations.43 Thus, the “molecular chaos” that Bohm had 
abandoned after his discussions with Pauli came back in his work with Vigier. Since 
Tiomno was Bohm’s main Brazilian collaborator, it is interesting to recover a recent 
quotation from Wheeler, which gives an idea of Tiomno’s stature as a theoretical physicist: 
“I always think of Tiomno as one of the most unappreciated of physicists. His work on 
muon decay and capture in 1947-1949 was path-breaking and would still merit recognition 
by some suitable award.” In 1987, Wheeler nominated Tiomno, Chien-Shiung Wu, Robert 
E. Marshak, and E. C. George Sudarshan for the Nobel Prize, without success.44 With 
Tiomno and Schiller, Bohm included spin as a physical property of his model, although 
they used analogies with Pauli’s equation and not relativity.45 Still, with Vigier, Bohm 
began to approach elementary particles by using models of those particles as extended 
bodies in space-time, and equaling their freedom degrees to their quantum numbers, in 
order to get a classification for the myriad newly discovered particles. This paper was 
published some years later,46 and it was the beginning of a lasting collaboration among 
Bohm, Vigier, de Broglie, and their associates.47 With Walter Schützer, Bohm worked on a 
study of the role of probability in physical theories.48 In Brazil, he also developed his 
philosophical ideas, changing the privileged status he had attributed to causal descriptions 
in physical theories. Those developments, as they appeared in Causality and chance in 
modern physics – a book written when still in Brazil but only published in 1957, led Bohm 
to conceive of both causal and probabilistic descriptions as possibilities with the same 
philosophical rank in science. This reflection contributed to take him far from his causal 
description, an intellectual shift that would clearly appear in Bohm’s ideas of the 1970s. 
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(1958), 1882-91.  ... alors [en Brésil] Bohm et moi on a fait deux papiers, un qui a été fait de suite, qui est 
sorti en 1954, sur la statistique, et un deuxième qui est sorti plus tard. » Vigier, (ref. 42). 
47 The main achievements of this approach were presented in Louis de Broglie et al, Rotator model of 
elementary particles considered as relativistic extended structures in Minkowski space, PR, 129 (1963), 
438-50. 
48 Bohm & Schützer, (ref. 39). 
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The collaboration between Bohm and Vigier, which was based initially in Brazil, 
reflects a certain irony typical of the Cold War. While Bohm was in Brazil for being 
Communist, Vigier could perhaps not have visited him in the US, for the same reason. In 
fact, Vigier, before becoming one of the most active spokesmen for the causal program, 
had already been well known as a Communist in post World War II France, and it is 
doubtful that he would have received an American visa to visit the US to work with Bohm. 
As Jessica Wang has pointed out in writing about the “age of anxiety” in American history, 
“in addition to refusing passports to American scientists, the State Department also 
restricted the entry of foreign scientists with left-wing political ties into the United States. 
[..] Scientists from France, where the Left was particularly strong, had an especially hard 
time. As much as 70 to 80 percent of visa requests from French scientists were unduly 
delayed or refused.”49 
 
For Bohm, Vigier was the most instrumental collaborator, for it was Vigier who 
convinced de Broglie to return to his early position of searching for a deterministic 
approach to quantum mechanics. A Nobel Prize winner and one of the founding fathers of 
the new theory, de Broglie was Bohm’s most eminent ally in the defense of the causal 
interpretation.50 Vigier also motivated a group of young Marxists to work on their ideas, 
and the Institut Henri Poincaré, in Paris, under the leadership of de Broglie and Vigier, 
became the main institutional base for supporters of the causal interpretation for many 
years.51 After the first news from Paris, Bohm became excited with the perspectives of this 
collaboration (Have you seen discussion of causal interp. of qu. theory in one of later 
issues of French magazine, Pensée),52 not only for the possibility of working on the causal 
interpretation, but also because Vigier’s collaboration struck a very sensitive chord in 
Bohm’s motivation to pursue the causal interpretation, a motivation related to his Marxist 
                                                
49 Wang (ref. 7), 278). 
50 For the evolution of de Broglies thoughts on these issues, see Louis de Broglie, La physique quantique 
restera-t-elle indéterministe? Bulletin Soc. française de philosophie, XLVI (1953), 135-173. 
51 Cross saw Bohms work just as a reflection of the ideological Marxist climate of the time; thus he missed 
the fact that the quantum controversy continued even when that climate faded. Andrew Cross, The crisis in 
physics: Dialectical materialism and quantum theory, Social Studies of Science, 21 (1991), 735-59. A lacuna 
in the history of physics in the 20th century is the analysis of the activities of the de Broglie  Vigier group. 
52 I have been in communication with Regner + Schatzman. They tell me about all sorts of wonderful 
discoveries using these new ideas, but as yet no details. I have sent them letters recently urgently asking for 
details. David Bohm to Miriam Yevick, 24 Dec [1952]. Ibid., n.d. BP. 
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engagement: “I have heard from someone that in a debate on causality given in Paris, when 
our friend Vigier got up to defend causality, he was strongly cheered by the audience, 
(which contained a great many students) I would guess that many of the younger people in 
Europe recognize that the question of causality has important implications in politics, 
economy, sociology, etc.”53 However, Bohm hoped for more support from Marxists; he did 
not accept the distance from the causal interpretation of Philip Morrison - an American 
physicist well known for his Marxist positions, and he complained about the absence of 
support from Soviet physicists, asking why the causal interpretation had appeared in the 
West and not in the USSR.54 
 
Brazilian funds for the causal interpretation 
 
The support that Bohm found in Brazil for his research can also be evidenced by 
the funds he raised. Bohm arrived at a moment when Brazilian physics was flourishing, 
after Cesare Lattes’s discovery, in 1947, with Cecil F. Powell and Giuseppe Occhialini, in 
England, of the pion in cosmic rays, and the detection by Lattes and Eugene Gardner, in 
the United States, of artificially produced pions. These scientific achievements resonated in 
Brazil, and led to an alliance between scientists, the military, businessmen, and politicians 
that was aimed at developing nuclear physics, and physics in general, in Brazil. This 
alliance led to the creation of the Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Físicas [CBPF] and, in the 
same year that Bohm arrived in Brazil, to the creation of the first federal agency 
exclusively dedicated to funding scientific research, the CNPq.55 From that agency, Bohm 
                                                
53 David Bohm to Miriam Yevick, 5 Nov 1954. BP. 
54 This type of inconsistency in Phil [Morrison] disturbs me. He should be helping, instead of raising 
irrelevant obstacles; David Bohm to Melba Phillips, n.d. BP. Then the orientation is determined strongly 
by the older men, such as Fock and Landau, [] It is disappointing that a society that is oriented in a new 
direction is still unable to have any great influence on the way in which people think and work; idem, 18 
Mar 1955. BP. I ask myself the question Why in 25 years didnt someone in USSR find a materialistic 
interpretation of quantum theory? [] But bad as conditions are in US etc, the only people who have thus 
far had the idea are myself in US, and Vigier in France. David Bohm to Miriam Yevick, 7 Jan 1952. BP. 
55  Ana M. R. Andrade, Físicos, mésons e política: a dinâmica da ciência na sociedade (São Paulo, 1999); 
idem, The discovery of the π-meson,  Helge Kragh et al, eds., History of modern physics (Turnhout, 2002), 
313-21. Personal reminiscences from this period are in José Leite Lopes, Cinquenta e cinco anos de física 
no Brasil: evocações, unpublished paper, (Rio de Janeiro, 1998), available at 
http://www4.prossiga.br/Lopes/. Impressions on Brazilian physics, by a contemporary visitor, are in Gordon 
L. Brownell, Physics in South America, Physics Today, 5 (July 1952), 5-12, on 11-12. It is true that, at the 
beginning of the 1950s, the main activities in Brazilian theoretical physics had shifted from São Paulo to Rio 
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received several grants to develop the causal interpretation. In 1952, the Department of 
Physics of USP was granted Cr$1,246.000.00 by the CNPq, and a supplement of 
Cr$528,000.00 was assured in December 1953. About 18% and 24% of those amounts, 
respectively, went to grants for students and visiting professors related to Bohm’s activities 
at USP. Those funds permitted Bunge to stay in São Paulo for one year, and Schiller to 
have his wages supplemented for two years.56 Besides, Bohm asked for and received 
Cr$18,000.00 for the travel expenses of Schiller and his wife from the US;57 Cr$37,200.00 
for the stay of Vigier at USP, for three months;58 Cr$100,000.00 for research on cosmic 
rays by Kurt Sitte as well as an air ticket for him and his family plus Cr$180,000.00 to 
complement for one year the wages Sitte would receive from USP.59 Bohm also won grants 
for the students Abrahão Zimmerman, Ruth Pereira da Silva, Paulo Roberto de Paula e 
Silva, and Klaus Tausk.60 Rosenfeld, Rabi, and von Weizsäcker, physicists who interacted 
with Bohm but were not invited by him, also had their stays in Brazil supported by the 
CNPq.61 Not all those funds went to the development of the causal interpretation, since 
some of them went to research on cosmic rays, a field under Bohm’s responsibility at USP. 
Nevertheless, the board of the CNPq explicitly supported the development of the causal 
interpretation, as in the case when Joquim Costa Ribeiro, the Brazilian Scientific Director 
of the agency, presented Bohm’s application for funds to support Vigier’s visit. Costa 
Ribeiro supported the application in the following terms, 62 
 
I call the attention of the Board to the interest of this subject. Prof. Bohm is today 
on the agenda of theoretical physics at an international level, due to his theory, 
which is a little revolutionary because it intends to restore in quantum mechanics 
the principle of determinism, which seems, in a certain way, to have been shaken 
                                                                                                                                              
de Janeiro. Nevertheless, there were close relations between the two centers, and Bohm commuted between 
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
56 AC [Processo 578/51]. I am grateful to Ana M. R. Andrade, and her assistants, Tatiane dos Santos and 
Vanessa Albuquerque, for their help in unearthing those documents. 
57 AC [Processo 572/52]. 
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59 AC [Processo 243/53]. Sitte came from Syracuse University to Brazil, after receiving an invitation from 
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61 AC [Processos 1704/53, 504/53, 249/52, respectively]. 
62 AC, Records of the Conselho Diretor, 139th meeting, 25 Feb 1953.  
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by Heisenberg’s principle. Prof. Bohm seems to have found one solution to this 
difficulty of modern physics, trying to conciliate quantum mechanics with the rigid 
determinism of classical physics. I am not speaking in detailed technical terms, but 
summarizing the issue. Bohm’s theory has given rise to a great debate in Europe 
and United States, and Prof. Vigier has expressed his willingness to come to Brazil, 
mainly to meet the team of theoretical physics and discuss the problem here. This 
seems to me to be a very prestigious thing to Brazil and to our scientific 
community. 
 
When Bohm came to Brazil, he had not yet published his causal interpretation, and 
the support for his position at USP was not related to that scientific program. Once he was 
in Brazil, however, support from the CNPq was not independent of his program; in fact, it 
was conscious support for the causal interpretation. 
 
Bohms uneasiness in Brazil 
 
If one adds to the facts previously reported the letters exchanged with Einstein, 
Pauli, Phillips, the debates in scientific journals with Takabayasi, Keller, Epstein, Halpern, 
and Freistadt, the papers by Rosenfeld, Pauli, Born, and Heisenberg, the laudatory papers 
by Schatzman, and Freistadt in cultural magazines, and the news Bohm had from Bohr and 
von Neumann, one cannot maintain that the causal interpretation passed unnoticed.63 
Noticed, however, does not mean favorably received. In fact, it had an unfavorable 
reception among physicists, which contributed to Bohm’s uneasiness in Brazil. He was 
inclined to consider people intellectually meaningful inasmuch as they were receptive to 
the causal interpretation, and, by the same token, he did not understand people who were 
skeptical. It is noteworthy, for instance, as we have seen, how his high regard for Feynman 
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was based on Feynman’s receptive attitude towards the logical possibility of a causal 
interpretation of quantum theory, and not on Feynman’s methods of renormalization, for 
which he was highly regarded among physicists. Bohm’s hopes were not modest, “if I can 
succeed in my general plan, physics can be put back on a basis much nearer to common 
sense than it has been for a long time,” and his mood oscillated depending on the reception 
of his ideas, or on the work he had done on them. So, we find letters saying, on one hand, 
“I gave two talks on the subject here, and aroused considerable enthusiasm among people 
like Tiomno, Schützer, and Leal-Ferreira, who are assistants […]. Tiomno has been trying 
to extend the results to the Dirac equation, and has shown some analogy with Einstein’s 
field equations”, and, on the other hand, “ I am becoming discouraged also because I lack 
contact with other people, and feel that there is a general lack of interest in new ideas 
among physicists throughout the world.”64 
 
Only by taking into account Bohm’s idiosyncratic attitude towards physicists who 
did not share his opinion about the causal interpretation can one understand his relations 
with Brazilian physicists. Indeed, theoretical physicists, such as Schönberg, Leite Lopes, 
and even Tiomno, did not support the causal interpretation research program, insofar as 
one understands that program as the adoption of its philosophical premises, like the 
recovering of determinism, and as a rival to the Copenhagen interpretation. Tiomno 
collaborated with Bohm just to see what physics one could develop by using that model, 
not sharing Bohm’s philosophical premises. Leite Lopes, a former student of Pauli’s, was 
skeptical about the causal interpretation. Schönberg worked on the mathematical 
foundations of quantum theory and on the hydrodynamic model of quantum mechanics, a 
model close to the model Bohm and Vigier worked on, but he was against the idea of 
recovering a causal description in atomic phenomena. “Schönberg is 100% against the 
causal interpretation, especially against the idea of trying to form a conceptual image of 
what is happening. He believes that the true dialectical method is to seek a new form of 
mathematics, the more subtle the better, and try to solve the crisis in physics in this way. 
As for explaining chance in terms of causality, he believes this to be reactionary and 
undialectical. He believes instead that the dialectical approach is to assume pure chance 
                                                
64 David Bohm to Melba Phillips, 28 June 1952; ibid., [w.d.], BP (C.46  C.48). David Bohm to Hanna 
Loewy, 6 Oct 1953, BP (C.39). 
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which may propagate from level to level, but which is never explained in any way, except 
in terms of itself.65 The attitude of theoretical physicists in Brazil towards Bohm’s 
approach was not unique, but rather reflected “l’air du temps”, a time in which adhesion to 
the Copenhagen interpretation as the only viable interpretation of quantum mechanics was 
widespread among physicists everywhere, and Bohm did not like this attitude. 
 
I conclude the first part of this paper by noting that Brazil was a richer environment 
than that depicted by historians who based their analysis exclusively on Bohm’s letters. 
Bohm’s dissatisfaction resulted not only of the country he met but also stemmed from the 
confiscation of his passport as well as the unfavorable reception of his causal interpretation 
not only in Brazil but also in the United States and Europe. It is certain, though, that Brazil 
was not the best place for Bohm to fight a controversy on such a hot subject. If I take 
Bruno Latour’s idea of “centre of calculation,”66 or the looser dichotomy between center 
and periphery, the USP and the Brazilian Center for Rescarch in Physics constituted 
neither such a center nor a backward physics community. They should be ranked on an 
intermediate level of such hierarchies, and if Bohm’s Brazilian exile was a nuanced 
context, it needs to be balanced with other aspects to estimate its true role in the poor 
reception of Bohm’s causal interpretation. The next part of this paper is dedicated to this 
task. 
 
2. THE RECEPTION OF THE CAUSAL INTERPRETATION 
The reaction of the Copenhagen’s supporters 
 
The main opposition to the causal interpretation came from the old generation of 
supporters of the Copenhagen interpretation, such as Pauli, Heisenberg, Rosenfeld, Born, 
and Bohr.67 The best description for the intellectual authority of this team, on issues related 
                                                
65 For Tiomnos stance, Freire Jr. (ref. 9), 95. David Bohm to Miriam Yevick, 24 Oct 1953. BP. For 
Schönbergs work on quantum mechanics and geometry, see Mario Schönberg, Quantum Theory and 
Geometry, Max Planck Festschrift (Berlin, 1958), 321. 
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222. 
67 Rosenfelds and Paulis reactions will be analyzed in this paper. For Heisenbergs reactions, see Werner 
Heisenberg, The Development of the Interpretation of the Quantum Theory, Wolfgang Pauli et al, eds., 
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to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, is that already quoted by Max Jammer, who 
spoke about an “almost unchallenged monocracy of the Copenhagen school in the 
philosophy of quantum mechanics.” Along the same lines, Mara Beller analyzed the 
Copenhagen dogma as the rhetoric of finality and inevitability. As she wrote, the 
founders and followers of the Copenhagen interpretation advocated their philosophy of 
physics not as a possible interpretation but as the only feasible one. My discussion of 
Rosenfelds and Paulis reactions entirely agrees with her analysis. Additionally, while 
analyzing commemorative practices in physics, she gave a description of the dominance of 
the Copenhagen interpretation, appealing for Bohrs role as a charismatic leader, a 
combination of intimidating authority and irresistible charisma, concluding that Bohrs 
unprecedented authority resulted [] in an uncritical following of the Copenhagen 
philosophy. Interesting as Bohrs personality could be, I intend to deal with the 
dominance of the Copenhagen interpretation in a broader context.68 
 
Pauli and Rosenfeld, were the first to react, and were the more influential. In fact, 
there was a division of labor between them; Pauli concentrated on the physical and 
epistemological aspects, while Rosenfeld dealt with the philosophical and ideological ones. 
Indeed, the division of labor was not planned, but it became clear when they exchanged 
letters while writing their papers for de Broglies Festschrift, as Rosenfeld explained to 
Pauli, My own contribution to the anniversary volume has a different character. I 
deliberately put the discussion on the philosophical ground, because it seems to me that 
the root of evil is there rather than in physics. I have already discussed Pauli’s early 
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criticisms and Bohm’s replies, which eventually led Pauli to recognize the logical 
consistency of Bohm’s proposal. After Bohm’s papers appeared in print, Pauli came with 
new criticisms, which surprised Bohm: “I am surprised that Pauli has had the nerve to 
publicly come out in favor of such nonsense.” Bohm was infuriated, “I certainly hope that 
he publishes his stuff, as it is so full of inconsistencies and errors that I can attack him from 
several different directions at once.” Pauli had criticized the fact that the causal 
interpretation did not preserve the symmetry between position and momentum 
representations, expressed in the standard formalism by the theory of unitary 
transformations, which was responsible for the mathematical elegance of the theory; had 
considered a weakness of the causal interpretation the absence of its relativist 
generalization; and had stated that the meaning of Ψ in Bohm’s model had been borrowed 
from the quantum theory, a criticism we had already commented. The dispute was not 
limited to the published papers. In a letter to Markus Fierz, Pauli used his bitter irony, 
writing that he was not surprised with the alliance between de Broglie and Vigier aiming to 
restore determinism to physics. He argued that both Catholics and Communists depended 
on determinism for reassuring their eschatological faiths, the former in the heaven after 
earthy life, the latter in the heaven still on earth. Pauli also warned “Beppo”, his old friend, 
against sympathy with Bohm’s approach. The Italian physicist Giuseppe Occhialini had 
worked at USP during the 1930s, and kept up his scientific collaboration with that 
university after the Second World War. Pauli wrote to him: “Beppo, what about South 
America? (For all cases I warn you for Bohm in São Paulo and his ‘causal’ quantum 
theory).”69 
 
The division of labor between Pauli and Rosenfeld left the latter to the 
philosophical and ideological criticisms. For him, complementarity was both a direct result 
of experience and an indelible part of quantum theory.70 Since complementarity implied the 
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abandon of determinism, Rosenfeld saw the causal interpretation as a metaphysical – not 
scientific – attempt at dealing with quantum phenomena. According to him, “Determinism 
has not escaped this fate [to cease to be fertile and become obstacles to progress]; the 
physicist who still clings to it, who shuts his eyes to the evidence of complementarity, 
exchanges (whether he likes it or not) the rational attitude of the scientist for that of the 
metaphysician;” and he appealed for Marxist authors to reinforce his position, “The latter, 
as Engels aptly describes him, considers things ‘in isolation, the one after the other and the 
one without the other,’ as if they were ‘fixed, rigid, given once for all.’”71 To understand 
the blend of philosophy and ideology in Rosenfeld’s argument, one needs to consider that 
besides being a physicist very sensitive to philosophical matters, that most of his work as 
Bohr’s assistant was related to epistemological matters, that he had been engaged in 
Marxism since the thirties, and that Rosenfeld’s Marxism was closer to Western Marxism 
than it was to Soviet Marxism, to use the terms introduced by Perry Anderson in order to 
make sense of Marxist trends in the 20th century.72 Rosenfeld was convinced that 
complementarity was a dialectical achievement73 that should be defended not only from 
Bohm’s criticisms but also from Soviet critics who blamed it for introducing idealism in 
physics. As this Soviet criticism was in tune with the ideological climate in the USSR at 
the time, we can say that Rosenfeld was both orthodox in quantum mechanics and 
heterodox in Marxism. 
 
Rosenfeld mobilized all the means he had to fight for complementarity and against 
the causal interpretation. He wrote to Frédéric Joliot-Curie – a Nobel prize winner and 
member of the French Communist Party - pushing him to take a position against French 
Marxist critics of complementarity;74 advised Pauline Yates – Secretary of the “Society for 
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cultural relations between the peoples of the British Commonwealth and the USSR” – to 
withdraw from Nature her translation of a paper from the Soviet physicist Yakov Ilich 
Frenkel, which was critical of complementarity;75 took the initiative of writing to Nature’s 
editors suggesting that they not to publish a paper by Bohm entitled “A Causal and 
Continuous Interpretation of the Quantum Theory;”76 and advised publishers not to 
translate into English one of de Broglie’s books dedicated to causal interpretation.77 
Rosenfeld’s stands found much support, as we can deduce from the letters he received and 
the fact that his first paper criticizing the causal interpretation was published in French, 
English, and Japanese.78 Denis Gabor wrote, “I was much amused by the onslaught on 
David Bohm, with whom I had a long discussion on this subject in New York, in Sept. 51. 
Half a dozen of the most eminent scientists have got their knife into him. Great honour for 
somebody so young;”79 and letters of support include Abraham Pais,80 Guido Beck, Robert 
Cohen,81 Eric Burhop, Vladmir Fock,82 Jean-Louis Destouches,83 Robert Haveman,84 and 
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Adolf Grünbaum.85 Some of them, however, did not accept all the incisiveness of 
Rosenfeld’s rhetoric, as was the case with Burhop and Beck.86 Later, when Rosenfeld 
published a review of Bohm’s “Causality and Chance in Modern Physics,” the same style 
cost Rosenfeld public disagreement with Lancelot L. Whyte.87 
 
 Rosenfeld, Pauli, Heisenberg, and Born successfully built a common front against 
the causal interpretation, but they needed to deal, mainly privately, with their divergences. 
Whereas Rosenfeld kept up a lasting public debate with Heisenberg until 1970, criticizing 
his leaning towards idealism, Pauli and Born privately criticized Rosenfeld’s mixture of 
Marxism with complementarity. As part of the debate, Max Born wrote and sent to 
Rosenfeld a 10-page typed text in which he argued that dialectical materialism could not 
be corroborated by reference to just one achievement of contemporary science. Ultimately, 
Born abandoned the idea of publishing the text having seen the beginning of a détente 
between West and East in the late 1950s. Wolfgand Pauli used his famous ironic and bitter 
correspondence style to hit Rosenfeld. When editing a volume in honor of Bohr, he wrote 
to Heisenberg saying that he had managed to prevent Rosenfeld, whom he labeled 
Rosenfeld “•BohrxTrotzky,” from adorning his paper with banalities on Materialism.88 
 
The label of “philosophical controversy” 
 
                                                                                                                                              
qui les animent : réalisme thomiste, déterminisme marxiste, rationalisme cartésien. Je suis donc maintenant à 
peu près le seul ici à soutenir encore linterprétation quantique de Bohr. 
84 I read with great interest your paper and I am glad seeing that our ideas are, in their essential aspects, in 
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(1958), 133-4. 
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Now I shall narrow my analysis to the discourse shared by Copenhagen’s 
supporters while criticizing the causal interpretation; the reaction of causal interpretation’s 
supporters to that discourse; and the social, and especially professional, consequences of 
such a dispute. Pauli considered that insofar as Bohm’s approach had “never any effects on 
observable phenomena, neither directly nor indirectly, […] the artificial asymmetry 
introduced in the treatment of the two variables of a canonically conjugated pair 
characterizes this form of theory as artificial metaphysics.” [If the] “new parameters could 
give rise to empirically visible effects, […] they will be in disagreement with the general 
character of our experiences, [and] in this case this type of theories loses its physical 
sense.”
89
 Rosenfeld, as we have already seen, “deliberately put the discussion on the 
philosophical ground, because it [seemed to him] that the root of evil is there rather than in 
physics.”90 In the published paper, he used softer words but with the same content: “I 
intentionally confine the debate to the field of epistemology, for the crucial issue is one of 
logic, not of physics.” About physics, he conceded, “Bohm’s argument is very cleverly 
contrived. One would look in vain for any weakness in its formal construction.”91 
Heisenberg termed causal interpretation as an “ideological” attempt.92 Niels Bohr and Max 
Born, quite apart from their reactions to the causal interpretation, always emphasized the 
epistemological nature of some choices related to interpreting quantum formalism. If 
metaphysics, philosophy, epistemology, and ideology were the terms, how could a 
physicist frame the controversy between causal or complementarity interpretation in the 
early 1950s? They saw the controversy, in the best case, as an expression of a strictly 
philosophical dispute concerning ontology (the constitution of the real physical objects as 
waves or/and particles) and epistemology (the status of determinism in physical theories, 
the completeness of theories, the role of the space-time description). In the worst case, 
‘metaphysical’ was used as an adjective defining disputes without implications for the 
development of physics. Even physicists who tried to present the controversy impartially 
shared this view. Albert Messiah’s case is exemplar. In his very influential textbook, 
published originally in 1958, he wrote, “the controversy has finally reached a point where 
it can no longer be decided by any further experimental observations; it henceforth belongs 
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to the philosophy of science rather than to the domain of physical science proper.”93 A 
similar example is Fritz Bopp’s statement, during a conference dedicated in 1957 to 
foundational problems in quantum mechanics: “…what we have done today was predicting 
the possible development of physics – we were not doing physics but metaphysics.”94 
 
To analyze how the supporters of the causal interpretation reacted to the 
philosophical controversy diagnosis, let us recall what result Bohm and his collaborators 
obtained. Their main achievement was the empirical equivalence with nonrelativistic 
quantum mechanics. Bohm and his colleagues consistently searched in the 1950s for 
results derived from the causal interpretation approach which were able to contrast such an 
approach with the usual quantum mechanics. He announced throughout the 1950s that he 
was developing a satisfactory relativistic generalization of his approach. Neither of those 
promises was fulfilled, 95 and this failure discouraged some of his supporters.96 The absence 
of new results reinforced the “philosophical” label of the dispute, but Bohm and his 
colleagues did not manage to weaken it. The original paper had had the technical title of 
“hidden” variables; afterwards, he shifted to name his own approach using the more 
philosophical term “causal interpretation.” His 1957 book was meaningfully entitled, from 
a philosophical point of view, “Causality and Chance in Modern Physics.” Vigier, acting in 
the more liberal context of France, presented Bohm’s and his own work as an “illustration 
of dialectical materialism.”97 I believe that Bohm and his collaborators trapped themselves 
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by accepting the “philosophical controversy” diagnosis.98 To develop the causal program, 
they needed to have people, mainly young physicists, working on it, and it could not be 
easy, if not impossible, to introduce in the agenda of research in physics a theme 
considered part of a philosophical controversy without creative implications for physics. 
The label of “philosophical controversy” contributed to keeping away new entrants into 
physics, because, after all, a career in physics is not a career in philosophy. Surely, the 
ideological label, as used by Vigier, appealed to young Marxist physicists, but this appeal, 
as effective as it was in the 1950s, was not enough to sustain such a research program. I 
will later consider other difficulties related to introducing the causal program in the agenda 
of physics research, obstacles concerning how quantum mechanics was being taught. 
 
The working of a monocracy - quantum mechanics training and research 
agenda 
 
Jammer’s description of the “almost unchallenged monocracy of the Copenhagen 
school in the philosophy of quantum mechanics” does not tell us how physicists adhered to 
such a school, or how they understood complementarity, the conceptual core of that 
school. John Heilbron, discussing the first missionaries of the Copenhagen doctrine 
provides some hints on these questions. He suggests that, beyond Bohr’s close circle 
(Heisenberg, Pauli, Jordan, Born, Rosenfeld) and their brilliant opponents (Einstein, 
Schrödinger), physicists did not consciously adhere to complementarity or criticize it, but 
rather used the quantum machinery to scrutinize the microscopic world. Heilbron also 
suggests that the philosophical flavor of Bohr’s views on the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics was responsible for American and British indifference to complementarity.99 
Sam Schweber added two American peculiarities, both of them hostile to the idea of 
philosophizing on issues of quantum mechanics, namely the placing of theoretical and 
experimental physicists in the same departments, reinforcing experimentation and 
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application and American trends toward pragmatism.100 Analyzing how American 
physicists reacted in the 1920s to the philosophical problems of quantum theory, Nancy 
Cartwright argued: “Americans in general had little anxiety about the metaphysical 
implications of the quantum theory; and their attitude was entirely rational given the 
operationalist-pragmatist-style philosophy that a good many of them shared.”101 After 
World War II, for reasons related to the post-war context, American physics watched the 
reinforcement of such trends; as argued by David Kaiser, “the pedagogical requirements 
entailed by the sudden exponential growth in graduate student numbers during the Cold 
War reinforced a particular instrumentalist approach to physics.” In this context, Kaiser 
continues, “epistemological musings or the striving for ultimate theoretical foundations – 
never a strong interest among American physicists even before the war – fell beyond the 
pale for the postwar generation and their advisors.”102 
 
If one considers that for European physicists, such as Bohr and Pauli, 
epistemological considerations were integral to their way of doing physics, one could get a 
hint of the complexity of the diffusion of the quantum mechanics, which has become 
universal by circulating through such different intellectual and professional contexts. As a 
matter of fact, the textbooks in which physicists learned quantum mechanics until the 
1950s did not “reflect much concern at all about the interpretation of the theory.”103 
According to Helge Kragh, “most textbook authors, even if sympathetic to Bohr’s ideas, 
found it difficult to include and justify a section on complementarity. Among forty-three 
textbooks on quantum mechanics published between 1928 and 1937, forty included a 
treatment of the uncertainty principle; only eight of them mentioned the complementarity 
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principle.”104 Bohr’s epistemological writings were circulated in papers presented in 
scientific meetings, and put together in anthologies, which are vehicles quite different from 
textbooks; physicists are formed, as remarked by Thomas Kuhn, mainly via textbooks.105 
The lack of complementarity’s lessons in the training of physicists was acutely felt only 
when it was challenged by the causal interpretation. Rosenfeld expressed his worries very 
clearly when he wrote “there is not a single textbook of quantum mechanics in any 
language in which the principles of this fundamental discipline are adequately treated, with 
proper consideration of the role of measurements to define the use of classical concepts in 
the quantal description.” At the same time, he was consciously helpless, as “there is thus 
most obviously an urgent need for a good elementary treatise […]. But it will be extremely 
difficult to find an author for such a book: those who have the competence to write it are 
too busy with other problems.”106 Doubtless, the preferred author for Rosenfeld, and who 
never wrote such a book, was Niels Bohr, 107 
There is great interest in the topic among chemists and biologists, but there is no 
book that one can refer them to and that could protect them from the confusion 
created by Bohm, Landé, and other dilettantes. I will now do my bit here in 
Manchester by giving a lecture for chemists and biologists; but nothing can replace 
the book that you must write. 
 
If the previous account seems plausible, it implies that Jammer’s description hides 
a social and intellectual division of labor among physicists. The monocracy of the 
Copenhagen school referred to two types of physicists. A few of them were involved with 
foundational problems, the extension of quantum mechanics to new phenomena, and its 
applications to old and new problems; the others were involved just with extension and 
applications because they believed that the foundational problems were well solved by the 
founding fathers of quantum mechanics. This context was very adverse to Bohm’s ideas. 
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People to do the work, physicists and physics students, were needed not only for 
developing the causal interpretation but also for the whole ensemble of issues related to 
foundations of quantum mechanics. However, it was not feasible for people to begin a 
career in, or to shift their interests to, a subject that was beyond both the training and the 
agenda of research in physics. It was not by chance that many of those who overcame such 
a barrier had interests beyond the field of physics, as in the case of the young French 
Marxist physicists. Keeping this context in mind, one can realize how Bohm was uneasy 
with physicists who were interested in another agenda of research, like Feynman, and 
pleased by the news he had from France. It is remarkable, finally, that the same absence of 
foundational issues in the textbooks, which in the short term ran against the critics of the 
complementarity interpretation, ran against complementarity itself, in the medium term. As 
time went by and the number of people interested in such issues grew, especially in the 
1960s, the absence of complementary in the training of physicists fertilized the ground for 
its critics.108 
 
A “field of struggles to conserve or transform this field of forces” 109 
 
Jammer’s reference to a monocracy elicits Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of scientific field 
with its unequal distribution of capital, symbolic but no less effective. Indeed, as early as 
1977, Pinch, in a well argued paper, used Bourdieu’s sociological framework of “scientific 
field” to argue that Bohm had successfully followed a “succession strategy” before 1952, 
i.e. accumulating symbolic capital, and had then switched to a “subversion strategy” with 
the publication of his heterodox paper on “hidden variables,” in 1952. Pinch doubted 
whether the strategy of publishing an “interpretation” had been the most adequate strategy 
to challenge the quantum theory and change that scientific field, but he saw the reaction 
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against Bohm’s causal interpretation just as a “conservationist strategy” of the “elite” of 
quantum physics. As he wrote, 110 
the attacks on Bohm by the quantum elite can be regarded as part of what Bourdieu 
calls the conservationist strategy to be followed by the elite to ensure continual 
return on their investments. Bohm, by advocating a heterodox interpretation, was 
challenging the elite’s authority by questioning the legitimacy of their previous 
investments in the interpretation of quantum theory. The official-history mode 
articulation of von Neumann’s proof can be regarded then as an attempt to maintain 
a particular authority structure. 
 
Pinch’s paper remains, in its essence, an appealing approach to understanding the 
poor reception of Bohm’s causal interpretation, and the bulk of archival documents 
unearthed since then seems to confirm this. While he adequately concluded that criticisms 
like Paulis and Rosenfelds are criticisms which are along the metaphysical dimension of 
scientific activity and do not involve the construction of a specific cognitive object onto 
which the dispute could crystallize, his analysis was focused on the symbolic role of von 
Neumanns proof. Indeed, its focus on von Neumann’s proof may not afford a 
comprehensive view of the monopolies Bohm was challenging with his “subversion 
strategy.”111 von Neumann’s proof was just part of what I am calling, after Jammer, the 
monocracy of the Copenhagen school. That proof did not play a role, for instance in the 
arguments by Rosenfeld, Pauli, and Heisenberg, nor did it play a role in the skepticism of 
physicists who were interested in other issues of research, like Feynman, Beck, and Leite 
Lopes. Incidentally, from what we know nowadays, von Neumann himself was less active 
in criticizing Bohm than were his European colleagues more identified with the 
Copenhagen interpretation and closer to Bohr. Keeping Bourdieu’s frame of scientific 
field, one can state that the investment in the idea that complementarity had already solved 
the foundational problems of quantum mechanics was bigger than in von Neumann’s 
proof, and for this reason it was defended with more determination. 
 
Von Neumann did not publish any paper criticizing the causal interpretation, and 
the few leads which appeared in Bohm’s correspondence suggested that he was more open-
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minded towards Bohm’s work than were physicists like Pauli, Rosenfeld, Bohr, and 
Heisenberg. Indeed, Bohm knew that “von Neumann thinks my work correct, and even 
‘elegant,’ but he expects difficulties in extending it to spin.”112 It is thus an intriguing 
puzzle in the history of science to know the grounds in which von Neumann reacted to 
Bohm’s proposal. The puzzle is not one of easy solution due to the absence of clear-cut 
documents. It is sure that in the 1950s he paid attention to these issues because, in spite of 
being completely busy with computer and military research. He did carefully revise the 
English translation of his 1932 “Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik,” in 
which that proof appeared, paying great attention to the philosophical aspects of the 
subject. To his publisher, he explained the delays with his revision of the translation,  
the text had to be extensively rewritten, because a literal translation from German to 
English is entirely out of question in the field of this book. The subject-matter is partly 
physical-mathematical, partly, however, a very involved conceptual critique of the logical 
foundations of various disciplines []. This philosophical-epistemological discussion has 
to be continuously tied in and quite critically synchronised with the parallel mathematical-
physical discussion. Indeed, there was a true tale behind the American publication of that 
book. von Neumann began it in 1945, and for ten years he faced problems with the 
copyrights (which were vested by the United States during the war), with finding adequate 
mathematical types, and with the translation. R.T. Beyer, suggested by Dover, did the first 
translation, but von Neumann carefully rewrote all of it. Eventually, it was published in 
1955, by Princeton University Press, once Dover gave it up due to lengthy delays. A 
convincing solution for the puzzle on von Neumann’s reaction to Bohm’s hidden variables 
was recently suggested by Michael Stöltzner, which was based on a philosophical 
reconstruction of von Neumann’s methods. Stöltzner argues that von Neumann’s criteria 
for the success of physical theory were,113 
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empirical adequacy in the narrow sense, […] simplicity of the description scheme, 
heterogeneity of the material described by it, and fertility for further developments; 
[and concludes that], as to these aesthetic criteria, the Bohm program performs 
rather poorly, […] von Neumann could accept Bohm’s proposal as an interesting 
model, but not as a promising interpretation. 
 
Rather, and more important to our attempt of contrasting von Neumann’s reaction 
with those by Pauli and Rosenfeld, Stöltzner was able to recover scattered fragments in 
von Neumann’s papers – like this, in 1955, “there have been in the last few years some 
interesting attempts to revive other interpretation” – which permitted him to state, “taking 
into account how fiercely Pauli rebutted the Bohm interpretation, these lines presumably 
represent the most conciliatory reaction to it among the fathers of the ‘Copenhagen 
interpretation.’” Thus it is time to remark that Bohm and von Neumann might have had 
free and informal discussions about the subject if Bohm had remained at Princeton. That 
opportunity was lost with Bohm’s exile, and it can be attributed to the effects of 
McCarthysm and Bohm’s exile on his research program. 
 
Until now, I have been using freely terms like “Copenhagen interpretation,” 
“complementarity interpretation,” and “orthodox interpretation,” and equating them to 
Bohr’s thoughts on quantum mechanics. However, this is problematical, as argued by 
Catherine Chevalley, who was interested in a question that I am not dealing with in this 
paper, i.e. why Bohr is usually considered an obscure thinker, but which presents a 
valuable consideration for our discussion. Chevalley convincingly argued that one could 
not understand Bohr’s reflections independent of their context, and that this context was 
related, on one hand, to the “history of atomic physics,” and on the other hand, to the 
“history of a philosophical tradition widely different in content from either logical 
positivism of Lebensphilosophie.” This last tradition would be more understandable if one 
takes into account “the very precise lexicon of post-Kantian epistemology.” For what 
interests us in this paper, Chevalley argued, “the term ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ 
appear[ed] only in the mid-1950’s in the context of hidden-variables and Marxist 
materialism,” which led her to consider that Bohr’s thoughts were distorted and assimilated 
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to a term whose exact content has been the object of wide disagreement. Chevalley also 
remarked that, among the critics, the first to use the term “Copenhagen school” had been 
the Soviet physicist Blokhinzev and, among the supporters, the first had been 
Heisenberg.114 Independent evidence, which reinforces Chevalley’s point, is that when 
Heisenberg did, he was criticized by Rosenfeld, who argued that such a label could lead 
people to admit the existence of other interpretations. Heisenberg conceded that Rosenfeld 
was right, 115 
I avow that the term ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ is not happy since it could suggest 
that there are other interpretations, like Bohm assumes. We agree, of course, that 
the other interpretations are nonsense, and I believe that this is clear in my book 
[Physics and Philosophy], and in previous papers. Anyway, I cannot now, 
unfortunately, change the book since the printing began enough time ago. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I can say that the very term “Copenhagen school”, 
which Jammer described as having the quasi monopoly of the truth on the issues related to 
the foundations of quantum mechanics, was rather the result of the battles of the 1950s 
than the result of a natural and continuous evolution since the 1920s, battles that affected 
the causal interpretation, isolating it among physicists, but that also affected the followers 
of the thinking of the founding fathers of quantum mechanics, distorting their views. 
 
Some comparative perspectives 
 
Before arriving at my conclusion, it is helpful to raise two comparative essays. The 
first is related to the role of the McCarthyist climate in the reception of the causal 
interpretation in different national contexts. The second is a comparison between the 
receptions, in the same context, of two alternative interpretations. When we compare the 
United States and Europe concerning the reception of the causal interpretation, it becomes 
clear that main characters were located in Europe: Pauli, Rosenfeld, Born, Heisenberg, and 
Fock, who wrote and acted against it, worked in Switzerland, England, Germany, and the 
USSR, and de Broglie and Vigier supported it in France. In America, the main reaction 
came from Einstein, who was a critic both of complementarity and the causal 
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interpretation. Einstein also openly criticized McCarthyism.116 Thus the fate of the causal 
interpretation, in the 1950s, was decided by actors not influenced by McCarthyism, or even 
in opposition to the anticommunist hysteria in the US. We have also seen that Bohm’s 
status as a Communist and a victim of McCarthyism did not work against him or his 
proposal in Brazil. Thus, we can arrive at the conclusion that McCarthyism was not an 
influential factor in the real battles between Copenhagen’s supporters and opponents. 
 
It remains an open question whether the McCarthyist climate prevented American 
physicists from discussing the causal interpretation.117 This possibility remains plausible, 
but the available documentary evidence does not afford a clear-cut answer. However, in 
order to settle how the causal interpretation was received among American physicists, we 
still need to examine other factor. In fact, Russel Olwell, who considered that Bohm’s 
persona as somebody tainted by McCarthyism was an obstacle to the reception of his ideas 
in the United States, produced a more elaborate analysis because besides the idea of a 
politically tainted Bohm, he appeals to some features of American physics after World 
War II, such as military funding (following Forman) and pragmatic tendencies (following 
Schweber), to argue that US physics was not receptive to any work that put in question the 
foundations of theoretical physics.118 Given the context of American physics, previously 
discussed, including its features related to the training of physicists, one can conjecture 
that, “whereas European physicists might indeed have neglected Bohm’s work because 
most of them had already made up their mind in favor of the Copenhagen interpretation, 
most in the US didn’t even think they had to make a choice (Copenhagen vs Bohm).”119 
 
A comprehensive answer to the role played by ideological and political factors in 
the quantum controversy needs to consider at least one other effect, because history of 
Cold War times, like history tout court, must be comprehensive. As Graham once 
remarked, In the very period when Soviet politicians were finding bourgeois idealism 
lurking in the minds of Soviet scientists, many American politicians were convinced that 
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the State Department was infested with Communists. In fact, Bohm’s persona as a 
Communist victim of McCarthyism was one of the effects of the Cold War climate on the 
reception of the causal interpretation, the other being the support it received from the 
young Marxist physicists, mainly located in France around Vigier, who saw research on 
the causal interpretation as part of the ideological battles of the times. I have argued 
elsewhere that the role played by Marxist criticism against the complementarity 
interpretation in the USSR and in the West was more influential than we have already 
recognized. Thus, the incidence of politics and ideology on the controversy about the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics still deserves more historical research.120 
 
The second comparative study concerns the saga of Hugh Everett III and his 
dissertation written, in the second half of the 1950s, under John A. Wheeler, at Princeton. 
Like Bohm, Everett produced an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics which 
was equally poorly received in its first ten years and revived after the late 1960s. 
Differently from Bohm, however, Everett did not have to face McCarthyism or exile. I will 
summarize the Everett’s dissertation, the obstacles it faced, and then compare Everett’s 
and Bohm’s case.121 
 
Everett’s motivation for suggesting a new interpretation for quantum theory was 
related to the challenge of quantizing general relativity, which was then and is still today 
an unsolved problem. He remarked that one cannot deal through quantum mechanics with 
the idea of a closed universe, a concept that is essential for cosmologists, since “the whole 
interpretive scheme of that formalism [quantum theory] rests upon the notion of external 
observation.” Indeed, Bohr’s complementarity also strongly relies on the assumption that 
you need to use classical concepts for describing and communicating the results inscribed 
in measurement devices, while the system under study is treated according quantum 
mechanics. And yet, von Neumann’s presentation of quantum theory introduced the 
axiomatic distinction between two processes of evolution of the quantum states: the first is 
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discontinuous and not ruled by the Schrödinger equation, and happens during the 
observations; the second is the deterministic change of an isolated system, governed by the 
Schrödinger equation, which is valid in the absence of measurements. Everett’s strategy 
was to dispense with the first of von Neumann’s processes and to push to its ultimate 
consequences a quantum treatment based exclusively on the second process. Everett 
considered a device measurement as just a subsystem of larger systems and treated such 
subsystems according to quantum mechanics. This argument was in line with von 
Neumann’s mathematical approach but far from Bohr’s insistence that device 
measurements should be treated according to classical physics. Everett’s tour de force was 
to attribute physical reality to the picture of an ever branching universe, each branch being 
the state of a subsystem plus the related state of the whole system, at a moment 
immediately after each physical interaction. Even though this scheme is far from our 
intuition, it is not logically inconsistent, “since all the separate elements of a superposition 
individually obey the wave equation with complete indifference to the presence or absence 
(‘actually or not) of any other elements.” Our common-sense intuition is preserved because 
“this total lack of effect of one branch on another also implies that no observer will ever be 
aware of any ‘splitting’ process.”122 
 
Everett’s ‘relative state’ formulation was not as heretical Bohm’s causal 
interpretation was. He considered that “it can be said to form a metatheory for the standard 
theory,” and described its advantages in dealing with some rather formal issues, such as 
“imperfect observations and approximate measurement” as well as in approaching a 
problem more central to physics, that is, its possible “fruitful framework for the 
quantization of general relativity.” Nonetheless, less heresy is still heresy and he made no 
qualms about stating his distance from Bohr’s epistemological considerations on quantum 
mechanics: “The particular difficulties with quantum mechanics that are discussed in my 
paper have mostly to do with the more common (at least in this country) form of quantum 
theory, as expressed, for example, by von Neumann, and not so much with the Bohr 
(Copenhagen) interpretation. The Bohr interpretation is to me even more unsatisfactory, 
and on quite different grounds. Because Everett was a reader of Bohm’s 1951 textbook 
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and his scheme shared Bohm’s realistic commitment, one can say, in short, that he put 
together Bohm’s realism and von Neumann’s quantum treatment of measurement devices, 
and therefore did not accept Bohr’s complementarity view about measurement. Everett’s 
dissertation left Wheeler, his adviser, at a crossroads. He early approved the physico-
mathematical scheme, “the correlation [paper] seems to me practically ready to publish,” 
but he disliked Everett’s epistemological considerations, which included a whole section 
on the different interpretations of quantum mechanics: “I am frankly bashful about 
showing it to Bohr in its present form, valuable and important as I consider it to be; 
because of parts subject to mystical misinterpretations by too many unskilled readers.” In 
fact, Wheeler, as a Bohrian, could not accept Everett’s rejection of against 
complementarity.123 
 
Paralyzed at the crossroads, Wheeler tried to follow both roads at the same time. 
He had the idea, which one could retrospectively call wishful thinking, of convincing Bohr 
of the value of Everett’s approach and persuading Everett to remove the epistemological 
considerations from his dissertation. Eventually, Wheeler pleased neither Greeks nor 
Trojans, as we will see. His plans Wheeler’s plans were far from modest. He wanted to 
publish Everett’s dissertation in full at the Danish Academy of Science as a way of 
legitimizing it among the supporters of complementarity. Since the strongest present 
opposition to some parts of it [Everetts dissertation] comes from Bohr, I feel that 
acceptance in the Danish Academy would be the best public proof of having passed the 
necessary tests.124 In 1956, with a draft of the dissertation in his luggage, Wheeler went to 
Copenhagen to review it with Bohr. The discussions there included Aage Petersen and 
Alexander Stern, besides Wheeler and Bohr. It is worth remarking that in the 1950s Bohr’s 
influence on the subject of the interpretation of quantum mechanics was so great that a 
Princeton dissertation was being reviewed in Copenhagen before being judged at Princeton 
University. Bohr could not, and did not, accept Everett’s ideas on the epistemological 
considerations about observation in quantum mechanics. The temperature of the debates 
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was so high that Stern reported Everett’s point as theology, which led Wheeler to reply, “if 
it is a theological statement to postulate the ‘universal wave function,’ it is also a 
theological statement to refuse to entertain the postulate.” The full content of the 
Copenhagenners’s judgment survived recorded in a letter by Rosenfeld, who was not in 
Copenhagen but closely followed all epistemological matters related to quantum 
mechanics: 125 
[Everett’s] work suffers from the fundamental misunderstanding which affects all 
attempts at “axiomatizing” any part of physics. The “axiomatizers” do not realize 
that every physical theory must necessarily make use of concepts which cannot, in 
principle, be further analysed, since they describe the relationship between the 
physical system which is the object of study and the means of observation by which 
we study it: these concepts are those by which we give information about the 
experimental arrangement, enabling anyone (in principle) to repeat the experiment. 
It is clear that in the last resort we must here appeal to common experience as a 
basis for common understanding. To try (as Everett does) to include the 
experimental arrangement into the theoretical formalism is perfectly hopeless, since 
this can only shift, but never remove, this essential use of unanalysed concepts 
which alone makes the theory intelligible and communicable. 
 
Wheeler came back from Copenhagen defeated, but he had not surrendered. He 
thought that the dissertation should be approved, but that the battle to convince Bohr 
should continue, this time by Everett staying in Copenhagen. In fact, the dissertation 
received formal approval at Princeton in 1957; and an abridged version of it was published 
in a special issue of Review of Modern Physics, along with the proceedings of a conference 
which Everett never attended, and a note by Wheeler about the possible convergence 
between Everett’s ideas and complementarity. Everett went to Copenhagen in 1959, but 
the discussions with Bohr bore no fruit. Disillusioned with the whole affair and satisfied 
with his work on game theory and computers with the Pentagon, Everett abandoned 
physics, and never again wrote a word on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, even 
when his ideas were revived ten years later and he had succeeded in a research career 
related to American defense. Through its first decade of existence, his paper received no 
more than 20 citations.126 
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Blocked by the monocracy around Copenhagen’s views on quantum mechanics, 
Everett’s ideas had a fate similar to the causal interpretation: they were poorly received at 
first, and revived in a different context, many years later. Everett faced some of the 
obstacles that Bohm had faced earlier, such as the stronghold of the monocracy of the 
Copenhagen interpretation; the way physics was practiced, with little interest in 
foundational issues; and the absence of results able to empirically differentiate the 
alternative interpretations from the complementarity interpretation. He did not face the 
vicissitudes which Bohm had lived through. One can say that Hugh Everett’s case was the 
opposite of David Bohm’s, for contrary to Bohm’s exile and persecution by McCarthyism, 
Everett was working for the Pentagon at the same time that his ‘relative states’ 
interpretation of quantum mechanics was suffering an unfavorable reception. 
 
The comparison between Bohm’s and Everett’s cases suggests that the obstacles 
they both faced, related to the cultural context of physics, were more influential in the poor 
reception of their interpretations than were the hardships Bohm faced because the 
McCarthyist climate. Could the results have been different if the circumstances were 
different? As fascinating as such a question could be, it is beyond historical investigation. 
We have seen that the struggles between the supporters of David Bohm and Niels Bohr, 
struggles in a field clearly dominated by the latter, contributed to creating the frame of a 
philosophical controversy between the partisans of determinism – causal interpretation - 
and partisans of the Copenhagen school. The results that Bohm and his colleagues were 
able to produce – a different epistemology and concepts, and empirical equivalence with 
non relativistic quantum mechanics, but without empirical or operational differentiation – 
both produced the disputes of the 1950s and resulted from them. The possibility of 
producing other results by having more people working on the foundations of quantum 
mechanics was prevented by the dominance of the Copenhagen school and by the way 
physics was practiced, i.e. with a low status for foundations of quantum mechanics. Thus, 
the cultural context emerges as more influential in the poor reception of the causal 
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interpretation than the vicissitudes related the era of McCarthyism and Bohm’s exile in 
Brazil. 
 
THE RUSE OF HISTORY 
 
In the course of time, there has been a change in the context we have been 
discussing, and Bohm’s contribution to this change cannot be underestimated. As I have 
argued elsewhere, the new context was produced by some new characters, like John Bell, 
Abner Shimony, John Clauser, Eugene Wigner, Bernard d’Espagnat, Bryce DeWitt, Alain 
Aspect, and some old ones, like David Bohm and Léon Rosenfeld, but required changes in 
the physicists’ attitude concerning the intellectual and professional status of issues related 
to the foundations of quantum physics. The monocracy of the Copenhagen school was 
broken from inside, via a dispute between Wigner and Rosenfeld about the measurement 
problem in quantum mechanics, in the 1960s. After that point, the literature on the subject 
has demonstrated a distinction which did not exist in the 1950s, the difference between the 
Copenhagen school associated with Bohr, and the Princeton school, roughly associated 
with von Neumann and Wigner. The field of research on foundations of quantum 
mechanics flourished in the 1970s and the 1980s, especially dealing with issues related to 
the Bell theorem and the measurement problem. It is a Hegelian ruse of history that the 
main scientific contribution from this field of research - the Bell theorem and experimental 
tests confirming quantum mechanical predictions and refuting locality – was motivated by 
Bohm’s insistence on the hidden variables. Honoring Bohm, Bell wrote, "in 1952 I saw the 
impossible done," referring to Bohms hidden variable interpretation. I conclude this paper 
by showing that this statement hides more truth than is usually recognized.127 
 
Smitten by Bohms paper, the Irish physicist John S. Bell attempted to determine 
what was wrong with von Neumanns proof, since it did not allow for hidden variables in 
quantum mechanics. Bell knew von Neumanns proof only indirectly, from his reading of 
Max Borns Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, but he could not read von 
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Neumanns book because at that time there was no English edition of it. The solution was 
to ask Franz Mandl, his colleague at Harwell, about the content of the book. Frank was of 
German origin, so he told me something of what von Neumann was saying. I already felt 
that I saw what von Neumanns unreasonable axiom was. He wrote to Pauli asking for 
reprints of his papers on Bohms proposal, but he probably did not like the views 
expressed by Pauli in the de Broglie Festschrifts paper. Bell went to Birmingham in 1953, 
considering hidden variables as one possibility for his studies. Asked by Rudolf Peierls, 
who would become his adviser, to give a talk about what he was working on, Bell gave 
Peierls a choice of two topics: the foundations of quantum theory or accelerators. Peierls 
chose the latter, which was the end of the first stage of Bells involvement with hidden 
variables. The intermezzo lasted ten years; he only resumed this work at Stanford, during a 
leave of absence from CERN. In the first of the two articles on the foundations of quantum 
mechanics that he published while in the U.S., the acknowledgements record both the very 
origin of his investigation and early and later influences: The first ideas of this paper were 
conceived in 1952. I warmly thank Dr. F. Mandl for intensive discussion at that time. I am 
indebted to many others since then, and latterly, and very especially, to Professor J. M. 
Jauch. Let us see now what motivation led Bell to resume such issues and the role of 
Jauch in Bells work. According to his testimony to Bernstein, 
I had once again begun considering the foundations of quantum mechanics, 
stimulated by some discussions with one of my colleagues, Josef Jauch. He, it 
turned out, was actually trying to strengthen von Neumanns infamous theorem. 
For me, that was like a red light to a bull. So I wanted to show that Jauch was 
wrong. We had gotten into some quite intense discussions. I thought I had located 
the unreasonable assumption in Jauchs work.128 
 
 A few words from the paper published by Jauch and Piron, the motive of discussion 
with Bell, can enlighten its motivation and complete the picture, 
There are several reasons why we propose to re-examine here von Neumanns 
proof again. First of all there seems to be a renewed interest in a critique of the 
foundations of quantum mechanics and some of the recent attempts in this direction 
have not always done full justice to von Neumann. [] Bohm in his book 
[Causality and Chance in Modern Physics, 1957] even goes so far as to accuse von 
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Neumann of circular reasoning. If this were true, this proof would mean, of 
course, exactly nothing and would leave all doors open for speculations on a sub-
quantum mechanical level and a deeper reality so dear to the above-mentioned 
authors.129 
 
 In this context, it is very understandable that Bell had introduced his first paper 
writing that it is addressed to those who [Jauch] believe that the the question concerning 
the existence of such hidden variables received an early and rather decisive answer in the 
form of von Neumanns proof on the mathematical impossibility of such variables in 
quantum theory. Bells work can therefore be placed in the tradition related to 
reinforcing proofs against hidden variables, a tradition that had been challenged by Bohm, 
de Broglie, and their collaborators. If the possibility of introducing hidden variables in 
quantum mechanics was the motivation, Bells approach was far from Bohms. Indeed, he 
was not interested in building viable models mimicking quantum mechanics; instead, his 
works focused on the critical analysis of the assumptions behind von Neumanns proofs 
and their reformulations, and later on the assumptions behind the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen 
gedankexperiment. This paper is not the place for presenting the Bell theorem. It is enough 
for us to note that it contrasted quantum mechanical predictions with a whole family of 
hidden variables that fulfilled the criterion of locality. To illustrate this criterion, which 
was implicit in Einstein reasoning, consider a two-particle system. Locality requires that 
what is being measured on one of the particles does not affect the other. In short, the Bell 
theorem is the following: no local hidden variable theory can recover all quantum 
mechanical predictions, and the quantitative measurements of this conflict are the Bell 
inequalities. This theorem has motivated since the 1970s a cornucopia of experiments 
aimed at verifying it. Before arriving at this theorem, Bell had shown both the restrictive 
assumption in von Neumanns proof - the additivity of the expectation values - and why 
Bohms hidden variables were possible; they were as nonlocal as quantum theory.130 
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Independent of its intrinsic merits, which still awake passions, hidden variables can 
afford to David Bohm a role in the history of physics comparable to Kepler, who 
contributed to the creation of modern science while looking for celestial music in the 
planetary system. In a rough analogy, Newton depended on Kepler as Bell depended on 
Bohm. The comparison is not mine. In 1958, Lancelot Whyte, an engineer and philosopher 
of science, defending Bohm against Rosenfelds attacks, wrote to Rosenfeld, Naturally 
you are fully aware [] that valuable results may spring from mistaken motives and 
reasoning. Kepler is a good example. But this awareness is not evident in your review. 
Bohm would have enjoyed this comparison, if he had known of it.131 
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